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Clifford Geertz, the great anthropologist of Indonesia, wrote that ‘Of all the 
dimensions of the uncertain revolution now underway in the new states of 
Asia and Africa, surely the most difficult to grasp is the religious’.1 This is 
true not just for the broad sweep of the decolonizing world in the mid-
twentieth century, but especially for the country that Geertz knew best: 
Indonesia. It is obvious that there was a religious dimension to Indonesia’s 
decolonization process (the Indonesian Revolution, 1945-49), but so far this 
has gone severely understudied. 
 Before the Revolution, Indonesian nationalism, like many of its Asian 
and African counterparts, had a strong strand of religious nationalism. The 
greatest manifestations of this religious nationalism were Islamic ideas, 
schools, and organizations that brought together believers across ethnicities 
to oppose colonial excesses or even Dutch rule in general. Islamic 
nationalism gave birth to the Sarekat Islam, Muhammadiyah, Sumatera 
Thawalib, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), and many other regional movements 
aimed at promoting Indonesian solidarity and self-rule.2 In this way, the 
Indonesian Islamic movement was similar to religious movements 
elsewhere in Southeast Asia in the early twentieth century. In Burma, 3 
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Cambodia,4 Vietnam, 5 or even (later on) Timor Leste,6 religious fora or 
organizations gave individuals a space to come together and an ideology 
through which to mobilize change, often in a national direction, but 
sometimes seeking to accommodate other aspects of the modern world. If 
religion had such a prominent place in the nationalism that led up to 
decolonization, it is only natural that religion would have an important role 
in the decolonization moment itself. 
 After independence, there has been plenty of attention to Islam in 
the building of the new Indonesian nation. Scholars have studied the 
struggle for an Islamic state, 7  the place of Islamic law, 8  the role of 
communitarian identities in politics, 9 accommodation of authoritarianism 10 
and the contribution of Islamic movements to democratization,11 to name 
just a few. The place of religion in nation-building was even a favorite topic 
of the Indonesian Ministry of Religion for a time.12 In the contemporary 
moment, which is obsessed with the place of Islam in politics and the 
shifting world order, it is unsurprising that the role of Islam in Asian and 
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African post-colonial states would be a major focus of attention, and this 
has been true across the Muslim world. Studies of Nigeria, 13  Turkey, 14 
Afghanistan, 15  and other countries have questioned how Islam impacts 
Muslim-majority national identity; scholarship on Pakistan has been 
particularly fertile in this area.16 Thus, since 1950 religion has been a crucial 
area of contestation for defining what the postcolonial nation would look 
like. 
 The place of religion in Indonesian nationalism of the colonial era 
has been fairly clear, and the place of religion in postcolonial state-building 
in Indonesia continues to receive attention, but the place of religion in 
Indonesia’s decolonization has been overlooked. This decolonization 
process, running (in the most conservative reckoning) from the 
proclamation of independence in August 1945 to the transfer of sovereignty 
in 1949, was a multifaceted struggle by the Indonesians to gain control of 
their own territory and gain recognition for their country. In such a complex 
process, surely religion was a key element in decolonization, just as it has 
been demonstrated to be both before and after decolonization. 
 Instead of focusing on religion, the historiography of decolonization 
in Indonesia has been dominated by the secular, nationalist narrative, what 
one might call the New Order narrative, calcified under the long regime of 
General-cum-President Suharto. This narrative foregrounds the position of 
the Indonesian Armed Forces (and within that, especially the army) in 
delivering Indonesia through a hard-fought war to a victory on the 
battlefield and on the world stage to become an independent nation. 17 A 
national documentation project in the 1970s published a book for each 
province to drive the narrative forward, and military-dominated history has 
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also had the most prominent place in state educational curriculum and 
public commemorations. 18 Mary Margaret Steedly has even shown how a 
kind of staid, military-dominated narrative became internalized among 
Indonesians seeking to earn a veteran’s pension.19 
 The English-language historiography of Indonesian decolonization 
has been much less army-driven, but it has overlooked religion nonetheless. 
Robert Cribb has described the Indonesian Revolution as ‘a long, fractious 
ceasefire punctuated by brief bouts of heavy fighting’.20 This led to many 
foreign accounts, including the earliest, emphasizing the place of diplomacy 
in the decolonization process.21 As I have argued elsewhere, Islam played a 
key part in the diplomatic efforts for Indonesia’s decolonization. 22 However, 
high-level negotiations are not the key way that Indonesians remember the 
decolonization process, and thus diplomacy has not been the focus of most 
research. Rather, the most common approach to the Revolution in 
Indonesian society and in foreign scholarship seeks the experiences of 
everyday Indonesians. 
 Even those Anglophone authors looking at ordinary Indonesians’ 
experience of the Revolution have largely overlooked the place of religion. 
Instead, they have laudably brought other social groups outside the military 
into focus. Much attention has gone to youth, 23 but also thugs and local 
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militias, 24 women, 25 railway workers,26 even foreign sympathizers. 27 There 
have also been excellent regional studies, which look at specific local 
dynamics in politics and social life.28 
 In the spirit of those studies on focused segments of society, 
Indonesia’s pious Muslims, often called by the Javanese term santri, form 
another key social group that had a distinct experience of the Revolution. 
Their unique position in society and approach to the issue of decolonization 
meant that they were able to make a special contribution to the Revolution 
as well. Pious Muslims believed that the Indonesian Revolution was a 
struggle to establish an Islamic state, and thus they understood the struggle 
in an Islamic manner, organized for the struggle in an Islamic way, and 
expected Islamic outcomes. 
 This argument does not discount or disprove the previous studies of 
other sectors of Indonesian society. Rather, it adds another group – and a 
particularly large group – that had a different experience and understanding 
of the Indonesian Revolution. Scholars should acknowledge this experience 
and understanding as representative for a significant portion of the 
populace. That acknowledgement would help to make sense of Muslim 
actions in the wake of independence, and to bridge the historical line from 
Islamic nationalism in the early twentieth century to efforts at Islamic 
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Islamic understandings of the Revolution 
 
Before looking at the ways in which pious Muslims mobilized for the 
Revolution using Islam, it is important to unpack Islamic understandings of 
the Revolution, as the motivation for their particular engagements with the 
struggle. Many santri participated in this war of decolonization because they 
believed the war was an Islamic struggle. There was wide variation across 
the country in the understanding of the goals of this Islamic struggle, i.e., 
what would characterize an appropriately Islamic outcome, ranging from a 
state led by a Muslim to a state that recognized Islam as its foundation and 
mandated Islamic law for all inhabitants. However, despite the spectrum of 
understandings about the goals, and furthermore the frustration of all of 
these goals in national politics, the shared basic framework of an Islamic 
struggle continued to orient many devout communities as they joined the 
Revolution. 
Evidence from published books, printed media, oral history accounts, 
and even government decrees all demonstrate that Muslims articulated the 
Revolution as an Islamic struggle. The most common phrase to capture 
‘Islamic struggle’, jihad fi sabilillah in Arabic or perang fi sabilillah in an 
admixture of Malay and Arabic, was quick to emerge after the Revolution 
started and continued to come up throughout the four years of fighting. It 
was used both to motivate participation in the conflict and to frame 
expectations about that participation. 
Most frequently, the invocation of jihad fi sabilillah to describe the 
Indonesian Revolution came in the form of fatwas, or juridical decrees, 
issued by Muslim clerics in support of joining the fight. Echoes of these can 
be heard in the documents from the early weeks of the Revolution, as news 
of independence spread.29 By October 1945 there were several major fatwas 
in circulation and by November 1945 regional decrees to this effect were 
being issued on an almost daily basis.  
The most prominent fatwas that have survived from this period 
emphasize both theological and political motivations for picking up arms. 
The fatwa issued collectively by ulama (Islamic religious scholars) in Banda 
Aceh on 15 October 1945 said ‘It is mandatory for us to join in the fighting 
of the enemies of God and enemies of the Prophet’ and called the fighters 
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‘the Army of Mujahidin that enjoys the Blessing of the Religion of God’.30 
The famous NU fatwa on 22 October, as East Java inched toward the Battle 
of Surabaya, instructed  
 
The Islamic community, especially followers  of Nahdlatul Ulama, is  
required to raise arms to oppose the Dutch and their accomplices  
who wish to re-colonize Indonesia. This  requirement is  a “jihad” that  
becomes mandatory for every Muslim (fardlu `ain) who is  within a 
radius of 94 km.31 
 
The use of the religious language of obligation, blessing, and a community 
of people following in the way of God demonstrate how the clerics who 
issued these fatwas believed that the Revolution had sacral as well as secular 
consequences.  
Although these two fatwas have survived in written form and have 
become emblematic of Islamic enthusiasm for the independence movement, 
they were far from the only juridical decrees that proclaimed the Revolution 
as an Islamic fight. The conference to found the new Masjumi political 
party in November 1945 began with a fatwa on jihad fi sabilillah. 32 At the end 
of that month, all mosques in Jakarta preached a sermon including a fatwa 
for Indonesian independence as a religious requirement. A similar 
resolution was passed by a major Islamic Congress in Bukittinggi, Sumatra, 
in December 1945. Another major text making participation in the 
Revolution incumbent on every Muslim in the archipelago came out in 
Purwokerto in March 1946.33 An Indonesian who was in Cairo at the time 
even reported a fatwa in favor of the Indonesian Revolution as an Islamic 
struggle being issued in Tunis! 34 More decrees came in 1947 with the First 
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Dutch Aggression/Police Action, in 1948 with the Madiun uprising, and as 
local battles spread throughout the provinces.35 
In fact, the infant Indonesian government was quite concerned about 
being overwhelmed by Islamic proclamations about the Revolution, which 
certainly would color the state’s international reputation if not necessarily 
challenge the government’s position on the nature of the fight. Thus, Vice-
President Hatta tried to nip this trend in the bud with a Government 
Declaration on October 17 1945, that prohibited any individual or non-state 
group from ‘declaring a Holy War’. 36  All evidence suggests that this 
instruction was unsuccessful, but fatwas declaring and renewing jihad 
continued throughout the Revolution. 
Sometimes these fatwas were issued orally, rather than in writing. (It is 
worth remembering that 93% of Indonesians were still illiterate as of 1945, 
so oral transmission would have been the most effective means to spread 
the message, anyhow.37) This was certainly the case for Saifulkan Angai, a 
young Muslim man in South Kalimantan at the time, who joined his local 
Muhammadiyah militia. His fighting unit was addressed by the leading local 
cleric, H. Mahyuni, who promised them that this was a jihad fi sabilillah, that 
their participation was fulfilment of a religious obligation, and that anyone 
who died in the fighting counted as an Islamic martyr. 38  Oral history 
suggests that this kind of local preaching was common in many corners of 
the archipelago, and thus Islamic understandings of the Revolution would 
have been circulating even more thickly than the documentary record can 
testify.39 
Although fatwas show a broad consensus that the Indonesian 
Revolution was taken as an Islamic struggle, evidence suggests a variety of 
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understandings of what an Islamic decolonized Indonesia might look like. 
These four years were a crucial window, though, for formulating in more 
concrete proposals for an Islamic state in Indonesia. The leading Sumatran 
Islamic leader and polemicist Hamka published a short book in 1946 on the 
nature of an Islamic State, and another on Islamic Revolution.40 Sjafruddin 
Prawiranegara while serving as the President of the Emergency 
Government of the Republic of Indonesia (the acting head of state while 
the rest of the Indonesian leadership was in Dutch detention after the 
Second Aggression/Police Action) wrote a slim volume envisioning Islam 
as the key pole around which all social life would be organized in the 
future. 41 Earlier in the Revolution, he had also penned a popular book 
expounding on the idea of religious socialism, which he believed would be 
the driving force of decolonization. 42 The Revolution is also the moment 
when the author and Islamic politician Zainal Abidin Ahmad wrote the core 
of what would later become his major tome Creating an Islamic State, with 
various key sections published separately in freestanding volumes. 43 The 
Revolution was a very vibrant time for leaders of the santri community to 
articulate ideas of an Islamic state as the fulfillment of the Islamic struggle 
for decolonization. 
Of course, the most famous effort during the Revolution to 
implement Islamic principles in the governance of Indonesia, the attempt to 
include a clause about Islamic law in the Indonesian constitution of 1945, 
failed.44 Because of that early failure, the day after Indonesia’s proclamation 
of independence, it has become easy to look back at events with the idea 
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that an Islamic future for Indonesia was a dead letter from the beginning. 
This view is anachronistic and incorrect however. Islamic ideas about 
Indonesia’s decolonization process and its future continued to flourish 
throughout the Revolution and beyond, and the fierce debates in the 
Constitutional Assembly of 1956-59 demonstrate how Islamic 
understandings were still flourishing on both an individual and a community 
level. 45  A significant sector of Indonesian society understood the 
decolonization process as an Islamic struggle for Islamic ends. 
 
 
Islamic mobilization reflecting religious understandings 
 
In light of the religious motivations for the fight, it is unsurprising that 
Muslims organized their participation in the revolution in distinctively 
Islamic ways. Delving into two examples briefly will demonstrate this point. 
First, Islamic religious leaders, ulama, led their communities through this 
time of war and played outsized roles in the Revolution. Second, Islamic 
militias were key participants in the actual fighting and in the mobilization 
of society for many communities. 
 The Revolution, like the Japanese occupation that preceded it, was a 
time of broken communication across the archipelago. This means that 
experiences of the Revolution were fundamentally local, less influenced by 
voices and leaders who were not actually present in the community.46 In this 
context, religious leaders – as often the most well-educated, well-respected 
authorities in their towns or villages – became especially prominent. 
 It has already been noted above how ulama issued fatwas in support of 
the Revolution as an Islamic cause, but they also became prominent 
revolutionary leaders in many communities. The most concrete means by 
which they might step up their community leadership was by taking charge 
of the local government. In the first two years of the Revolution, village 
headmen and district officers rolled over in huge numbers; the closest study 
of one region has found that an area near Surakarta had a 45% turnover rate 
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(80 of 180 officers were fresh faces).47 The newly selected individuals were 
disproportionately likely to be ulama or religiously-credentialed individuals. 
For example, after universal suffrage elections for village headmen in West 
Sumatra in 1946, 90% of the new headmen were aligned with the Islamic 
party Masjumi – the major party that called for an Islamic state.48 Many of 
these headmen were likely ulama, but even those who were not would have 
been close to religious elites. Although the data from across the country was 
not well-preserved due to wartime conditions, it is clear that many ulama 
took on formal positions in the new state, on the lowest level. 
 This new role for ulama had several important consequences for their 
communities. As one would expect, it allowed ulama to shape their local 
communities to bring them in line with the Islamic visions that they had for 
independence. Oral history evidence suggests that this was practiced insofar 
as it was practicable. One woman living in West Sumatra during the 
Revolution reported: ‘The regulations here were all sharia (Islamic law), and 
the leaders were in line with sharia from the village head to the district 
leaders; everyone followed sharia’.49 
 Another consequence was that ulama could become the image or 
manifestation of the new Indonesian state, as seen by other Muslims on the 
local level. Having a religious scholar as the embodiment of the 
independent state would have confirmed for many the Islamic 
understanding of the motivations for decolonization. Seeing a cleric leading 
the local government would have calcified the idea that the Islamic struggle 
of the Revolution would result in a religious state after decolonization was 
finalized. 
 Ulama were not just more likely to become local heads of 
government, though. Many ulama played prominent roles in actively leading 
fighting forces to bring about decolonization, taking up arms in support of 
the Revolution. They did this through the vehicle of the newly formed 
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Islamic militias that were springing up everywhere across Indonesia. Islamic 
militias seem to be the most prominent fighting force after the Indonesian 
national army.50 Indeed, in many regions, they were more prominent than the 
national army – better equipped, better funded, and more successful on the 
battlefield.51 
 Islamic militias also functioned rather differently from the 
Indonesian armed forces. One difference that elicited awe and wonder in 
other fighters was their willingness to die and unwillingness to retreat or 
surrender. 52 These attitudes actually stem from religious injunctions that 
apply during conditions of holy war, and they were drawn into Islamic 
militias through sermons, but also through handbooks such as M. Arsjad 
Lubis’s Guidelines for Holy War. Lubis warned Muslim soldiers that ‘To 
retreat or to run away from the battle (…) is among the greatest sins’.53 The 
theological propensity to put their lives at risk was escalated by the frequent 
use of amulets by Islamic militias. Although perceived as heterodox today, 
these were a common feature of Islamic fighting in the Revolution, and 
could range in form from a small slip of paper issued by a local cleric,54 to a 
strip of fabric worn across the forehead into battle,55 to an heirloom dagger, 
blessed by an Islamic leader and supposedly imbued with power to render 
the bearer invulnerable. 56 Belief in such amulets led many Islamic militias to 
brazen acts of recklessness when facing the enemy, giving them fierce 
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reputations, but also resulting in very high casualty numbers, especially early 
in the war.57 
In addition to the more heterodox use of amulets, Islamic militias 
kept up orthodox practices, as well. Many were known to pray together, to 
integrate religious sermons and military motivation speeches, and to 
redouble their religious commitments during the fight. Handbooks like the 
one written by Lubis gave guidance for special prayers and devotional 
practices while engaged in a holy war.58 
Islamic militias might be formed of a local community, organized by 
a kyai (Islamic teacher), 59 or a village community that chose to organize 
itself with a pious orientation, 60 but most often they were recruited from 
Islamic schools. On the island of Lombok, for example, the Nahdlatul 
Wathan school mustered a large militia under the leadership of teachers 
Tuan Guru Haji Ahmad Rifai and Tuan Guru Haji Faisal.61 In Solo, Central 
Java, a local newspaper reported that an entire Islamic school shut down to 
simply become a fighting unit. The story of 30 November 1945 describes 
the transformation of ulama and santri into soldiers: ‘The prayer beads that 
they usually hold are being exchanged for weapons’. 62 These units were 
natural, not only because the schools were already coherent groups of 
young men but also because religious teachers often also gave instruction in 
martial arts or self-defense to their students. 63 Creating a fighting unit out of 
an Islamic school, though, would drive home to participants once again the 
religious nature of their struggle. 
 The new role for ulama and the new vehicle of Islamic militias both 
characterized the Indonesian Revolution in many communities. This was 
more than Muslim participation in a greater, neutral, nationalist 
decolonization struggle. Instead, by putting religious leaders in charge of 
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their communities and entering battle in Islamic groupings, deploying 
Islamic practices, and inspired by Islamic messages, one can see how Islamic 
communities chose to participate in Islamic ways, suggesting that they 





The one religious movement within the Revolution that has received some 
scholarly attention was a group based in West Java that formally broke with 
the Indonesian Republic and declared a fully Islamic state. From that 
declaration, this became a long-lasting, low-level armed uprising, lasting 
from the 1940s through the 1960s as an effort to enact a more religious 
state by force. This movement, under S.M. Kartosuwirjo, has been 
popularly called the ‘Darul Islam rebellion’, and even some of the historical 
approaches to it have been skeptical of real religious motivations. 64 More 
recent scholarship, thankfully, takes the Islamic frame of the uprising more 
seriously.65 
 Many of the religious hallmarks that have already been described in 
other parts of the archipelago were also characteristic of the Darul Islam 
movement. Kartosuwirjo and his lieutenants called Muslims in West Java to 
join their fight against the Dutch because it was mandated by Islam.66 In 
fact, their initial break with the Republic of Indonesia came because the 
Darul Islam units were unwilling to retreat to the ceasefire line set by the 
Indonesians and the Dutch in 1947 – an unwillingness to retreat that was 
also found in manuals for holy war in other parts of the country.67 Ulama 
took on leadership roles in the Darul Islam.68 The core units fighting under 
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Kartosuwirjo came from an Islamic school that he had established in his 
wife’s hometown.69  
 Darul Islam should be seen within the broader context of the 
religious movement for Indonesia’s independence. It sits on a spectrum of 
religious understandings of the decolonization process, unique not because 
of its desire for an Islamic state or its understanding that the Indonesian 
Revolution was in fact a holy war, but rather because it was extreme in its 
non-cooperation with the Republic of Indonesia. The radically different 
understanding of the ends of decolonization held by the Darul Islam was 
just one of many interpretations that circulated on the grassroots level 






How, then, should we think about the role of religion in Indonesia’s 
decolonization process? Certainly religious ideas and ideals motivated many 
Muslims at the grassroots level to participate in the struggle for an 
independent Indonesia, and it also structured the ways that Muslims 
participated in the conflict. This was another segment of the population 
with an experience of the Revolution that differed from the mainstream, 
nationalist narrative, and a particularly large segment, so it is important to 
account for their understanding. 
 The religious experience of the Indonesian Revolution remained 
relevant in pious communities for many years afterward. Representatives in 
the Constitutional Assembly cited their communities’ sacrifices during the 
Revolution to justify demands for an Islamic foundation to the Indonesian 
constitution. 70 More recently, scholarship has pointed to communities who 
experienced the fight for decolonization as a holy war as the originating 
communities of modern religious extremist groups.71  
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In the twenty-first century, it is also important to think beyond 
Indonesia’s borders about the ways in which Islamic militias, participating in 
a broader political struggle, may interpret the struggle differently and have 
different aims coming out of the military phase. This has implications for 
recent and current crises in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. 
The idea could also be extended to other religious groups outside Islam. For 
example, the understanding that armed Buddhist nationalist groups have of 
the recent civil war in Sri Lanka or of the political reform process in 
Myanmar has been deeply colored by their religious approach, in ways that 
must be taken into account.  
Within Indonesia, the alternative, religious understanding of the war 
of decolonization in Indonesia cannot be ignored, because it is crucial to 
understand the broader sweep of Islamic social life ever since. It is time to 
write religion back into Indonesia’s decolonization process. 
 
 
 
